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Reflections on Healthcare Fraud Enforcement and
Corporate Compliance.. .with a Kentucky Flavor*
John E. Steiner, Jr. **
I. "THEY'RE IN THE GATE"
At a Washington, D.C. press conference in the fall
of 1994, the Clinton Administration (including
representatives from the White House, the Health
Care Financing Administration (HCFA)-since
renamed the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS)-the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and the Office of Inspector General of the
Department of Health and Human Services (OIG)
publicly announced that healthcare fraud was a top
enforcement-priority. Providers and suppliers across
America were informed that healthcare fraud would be the number two
enforcement-priority for the Department of Justice. Number two, after the
number one priority which was violent crime. Prior to the press conference,
healthcare fraud was eleventh on the DOJ's priority list. I listened to that
press conference, read the press releases and thought about the significance
of that day, particularly since the Administration described this new
initiative as "Operation Restore Trust."
II. "AND THEY'RE OFF"
In early 1995, while serving as Senior Counsel for the American Hospital
Association (AHA) at its Chicago headquarters, I received a call from a
member hospital. The caller was the Chief Financial Officer with a small
hospital in Eastern Pennsylvania. His voice had a noticeable stress level.
* At the time this article was written, the author was transitioning from his position in
Kentucky to his current position with CTCA. He thoroughly enjoyed the people and
experiences he had in Kentucky and pays tribute to that state's great horse-racing history in
this article.
** Esq., CHC, CCEP. Mr. Steiner is the Chief Compliance Officer for Cancer Treatment
Centers of America (CTCA), based in Schaumburg, Illinois. CTA is a national network of
hospitals providing a comprehensive approach to cancer treatment. Previously he served as
the Chief Compliance Officer for UK HealthCare of the University of Kentucky.
1
Steiner: Reflections on Healthcare Fraud Enforcement and Corporate Complia
Published by LAW eCommons, 2010
38 Annals of Health Law - 25th Anniversary Special Edition [Vol. 19
He asked for my fax number and told me that he wanted me to read a
certified letter sent to his hospital from the U.S. Department of Justice.
Little did I know that this was the start of the DOJ's "Medicare 3-Day
Window" national healthcare fraud enforcement initiative. Behind this
initiative was the collective might of HCFA, OIG and the DOJ. This first
national fraud enforcement initiative would reach nearly all members of the
AHA.
The caller faxed me the letter. I carefully read it-twice. The end of the
letter offered two undesirable choices: agree to proceed in a timely fashion
to settle the alleged fraud with the DOJ, or, in lieu of settlement, proceed to
litigate the civil False Claims Act allegations and face high statutory
penalties if you lose. I immediately called the Assistant United States
Attorney in Harrisburg, Pa. who signed the letter. We discussed the
situation and she told me that the DOJ intended to send similar letters to all
hospitals in America. I replied, "If you send this letter to all of our
members, I'll probably get 10,000 similar calls, 5,000 from our members
and 5,000 from their lawyers and consultants." With that, the starting gates
opened and we were off to the races.
III. FIRST TURN
As the False Claims Act letters started to reach hospitals across America,
increased attention was given to the technical requirements of the Medicare
3-Day Window rule, especially the operational and mechanical details for
complying with that rule. The AHA also became more engaged with the
OIG, HCFA and the DOJ in discussing both national healthcare fraud
initiatives and the complexities of Medicare program requirements in
general. The AHA met more frequently with federal agencies to probe and
confirm the government's theories, objectives and expectations. From my
perspective, it appeared that the federal government was shifting to an
enforcement approach for several reasons:
• To restore trust in our system of healthcare coverage and payment by
placing more accountability for compliance directly on providers and
suppliers. In short, both sides acknowledged in these meetings that there
was room for improvement;
* To try to reduce the rate of growth of healthcare expenditures,
especially for allegedly "medically unnecessary services," duplicate
billing, and billing for services not rendered;
e To send a message to the provider and supplier community that better
internal business practices, procedures, and internal controls were
needed;
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e To recoup money from the provider and supplier community to
demonstrate the effectiveness of Operation Restore Trust.
IV. SECOND TURN
As the healthcare fraud enforcement pack rounded the second turn on its
way to the backstretch, the provider trade associations (e.g., AHA, AMA,
AAMC, etc.) collectively became more engaged and focused on behalf of
its membership. This was to be expected, in part, because additional
national fraud projects were being launched-e.g., Operation Bad Bundle
(related to payments for laboratory services), the Physicians at Teaching
Hospitals (PATH) initiative, etc. As enforcement activity increased, so did
the provider community's efforts to improve compliance awareness and
suggest remedies.
I was fortunate, during this part of the "race," to be serving as Senior
Counsel for the American Hospital Association. In my position at that
time, I worked with a group of advocates and lawyers to engage in
structured discussions with the DOJ, HCFA and the DIG. In addition, via
its Regional Policy Boards, the AHA solicited ideas and built consensus for
an appropriate response by the AHA. One component of that response was
a suggestion to the OIG that it endorse model, voluntary compliance
guidance for hospitals.
V. THE BACKSTRETCH
During one of several meetings between the OIG and the AHA, I
suggested to June Gibbs Brown, the Inspector General of HHS, that she
might want to consider publishing model voluntary compliance guidance
for hospitals. I knew that Inspector General Brown had significant
experience with the Department of Defense and was knowledgeable about
the Defense Industry Initiative of the mid-1980s. That initiative was
undertaken, at the direction of President Ronald Reagan, by our nation's
military defense contractors to address compliance concerns with defense
procurement practices. That experience produced model compliance
guidance for defense contractors that was uniformly adopted for that
industry.
At that same meeting, I also pointed out that our nation's approximately
5,000 hospitals might enter into multiple settlement agreements with the
DOJ and the OIG, each of which would have to be carefully monitored,
both by the hospitals and by Independent Review Organizations. Also, in
the event of perceived breaches of the settlement agreements, the DOJ
would have to proceed to file False Claims Act cases against the offending
hospitals. This scenario did not seem to me to be the best way for a
superpower to address problems in an essential industry with, generally,
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inelastic demand and significant government oversight. The OIG agreed
with that perspective and soon thereafter engaged the AHA and other
healthcare trade associations in a public/private dialogue on voluntary
compliance guidance for hospitals.
VI. THIRD TURN
As the voluntary compliance guidance concept gathered speed and
traction, several drafts of model guidance were exchanged between the
OIG, DOJ, HCFA and industry representatives. From my perspective,
these meetings and draft exchanges were very valuable and constructive. I
received encouraging comments from government personnel who
emphasized how useful the public/private collaboration was to crafting an
acceptable document. In the course of this work, the DOJ made clear that
its discretionary authority to prosecute and enforce the law, especially
criminal provisions, would be carefully analyzed throughout our
discussions. This was not a surprise, especially since the same issue was
addressed in crafting voluntary compliance guidance for the defense
industry. The different enforcement authorities and practices of the OIG
and DOJ became very clear to me as we continued through the third turn of
this race. I recommend that anyone with a compliance or management role
periodically review the OIG Model Voluntary Compliance Guidance for
Hospitals. That exercise reinforces both the major compliance risk areas
and heightens one's awareness that many of those risk areas may be
enforced both by the OIG and the DOJ.
VII. FOURTH TuRN AND HOME STRETCH
The OIG's Model Voluntary Compliance Guidance for Hospitals was
published in February 1998. From the start of the "race," i.e. the launch of
Operation Restore Trust, to the publication of the Model Guidance, the
industry and federal agencies covered a great distance. The audience had
been waiting, somewhat impatiently, for the Model Guidance to appear
because there was a lot at stake. What would be the stated benefit of
adopting a voluntary compliance program? How many resources would it
take to properly design, implement and administer an effective program?
And how many new launches of national healthcare fraud initiatives were
waiting behind the bend?
Answers to these questions became clearer as those responsible for
writing and publishing the Model Guidance made public appearances to
multiple audiences across the country. The strongest theme to emerge from
the guidance was that a "paper" program would not be considered effective.
However, the OIG was considerate of the variances in resources and
expertise available to hospitals and said as much throughout the Model
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Guidance. That is why it is useful to periodically consult the Model
Guidance, as supplemented, for a grounding on the government's
expectations.
VIII. THE FINISH LINE
The race to the finish, i.e. the goal of tempering unbridled enforcement
with good judgment and sound compliance efforts, stayed on track till it
ended in the general satisfaction of government and private sector
audiences.
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